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Popular News in the Twenty-First Century: 
Time for a new critical approach? 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper is a brief review and critique of the main scholarly approaches to thinking 
about popular forms of news in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, 
particularly in regards to broadcast television. Rather than advocating the merits of either 
popular or ‘hard’ news, it will discuss the possibility of finding (or revisiting) a critical 
approach to popular news and current affairs1 journalism that charts a suitable middle-
ground: one that can accommodate the emergence of popular informational programs 
(e.g. The Awful Truth, The Daily Show) and one that moves away from the sometimes 
too simplistic binary discourses that have tended to become characteristic of recent 
debates over ‘tabloidisation’. 
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Journalism is considered ‘the most important textual system in the world’ 
(Hartley, 1995: 20), and ‘a job that is crucial to society’ (Cunningham, 2003: 31). 
Yet despite such large claims, scholarly discussions of journalism are often 
centred around loosely-defined terms such as ‘tabloid’ and ‘broadsheet’, or ‘hard’ 
and ‘soft’. As useful as these simplified approaches are, they often fail to 
recognise the increasingly blurred boundaries of journalism, and the fact that the 
 2
profession lacks a tangible, definable group of practitioners or set of practices 
(Deuze, 2005; Hartley, 1995; Bovée, 1999: 37). Unlike lawyers, for instance, 
there is ‘nothing that unites all the things that may be associated with the term 
journalism except the term itself’ (Hartley, 1995: 20), and anyone with a desire to 
be a journalist can ‘pick up a pen, grab a pad, and go’ (Bishop, 2004: 31). Yet 
although the profession’s ubiquity means it is mostly free of a locus for analysis 
and discussion, much contemporary debate about journalism has nevertheless 
surrounded the issue of commercialisation and textual notions of tabloidisation 
(for example, Franklin, 1997; Langer, 1998; Lumby, 1999a), perhaps at the 
expense of seriously debating its role in facilitating the operation of the public 
sphere. The competing (and often conflicting) priority of profit and service is the 
tension within journalism which has underscored so much of the recent enquiry 
into its social functions. At times this debate over popular news has been quite 
fierce, and is apparently unlikely to be settled any time soon. 
 
This paper is therefore a review of the key academic approaches to popular 
journalism from the late twentieth Century to today. It is an attempt to find some 
common-ground in the theory, and will suggest that we may be able to move on 
from the currently simplistic debates. This argument will be specifically tied to 
notions of ‘tabloidisation’, televisual forms of journalism – as television still 
remains ‘the dominant medium of journalism’ (Corner, 1995: 53) – and will adopt, 
very explicitly, an Australian perspective on these matters. There are a couple of 
reasons for the use of Australian examples in this paper, though the most 
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relevant is that the tensions involved in popular news production around much of 
the western world are actually captured very neatly with Australia’s ‘dual-
broadcasting’ system. The ABC, Australia’s public broadcaster is now seen 
(along with the SBS) as the last bastion of quality news and current affairs2, and 
yet it accounts for only a fraction of overall TV viewing. On the other hand, the 
news services which populate the free-to-air commercial networks are far more 
successful from a ratings perspective, though are hardly the epitome of 
exceptional journalistic practices – relying heavily on the quintessentially ‘tabloid’ 
stories of the crime and human-interest type. A likely explanation for this contrast 
is the limited space for news and current affairs anywhere in Australian 
television. Australia’s small number of commercial TV networks (just three, with 
bans on new licences), and still quite low take-up of pay-TV services has limited 
the potential for varied news services and apparently intensified the forces at 
play here. Such a scenario contrasts with, for example, the USA where pay-TV 
accounts for a very large share of total viewership, allowing, consequently, the 
‘space’ for a network such as C-SPAN. So, an Australian perspective, in 
analysing these matters, is perhaps quite poignant. 
 
Importantly, this paper will attempt to argue that those who chart a so-called 
‘narrative of decline’ in the quality of journalism, and those who have successfully 
re-thought the merits of popular news – and pointed out that there was never 
actually a high-point in the first place – have perhaps failed to notice the 
significant changes in news production over the last two decades. The entire 
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debate seems to have obscured the foresight of many scholars who have 
therefore neglected the (misnamed) category of ‘new’ news – a form of news 
programming that in fact may satisfy both sides of the debate. Despite the fact 
that journalism is a diverse field with indefinable boundaries, too much time may 
have been devoted to a more narrow consideration of news, and not enough 
attention devoted to the cases where news has been (and is) produced by those 
who would not traditionally be considered journalists. Ideally, this paper hopes to 
generate an academic discussion about popular news in the hope that the often 
cyclical arguments between – broadly – cultural studies and neo-Habermasian 
scholars cease to dominate considerations about popular forms of news and 
journalism. 
 
 
JUST ‘AIN’T WHAT IT USED TO BE… 
 
One of the key tenets of news and journalism is its provision of a service, 
keeping the world informed, and playing the role of society’s ‘score-keepers’ 
(Conley, 1997: ix). Journalists should ideally strive to serve the ‘vigilant citizen 
who must be properly informed’ (McGuigan, 1998: 98) in order to make ‘informed 
choices’ (Winch, 1997: 114).  News is considered an indispensable part of 
society because it is the way in which ‘good’ citizens facilitate their participation 
in the political public sphere (Moy et al., 2005: 111). An extension of this thinking 
would suggest then that the only way a citizen can function is through the 
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consumption of ‘hard’ political journalism untainted by the scourge of useless 
populism. Although this in itself is a problematic assumption, it is certainly a 
useful starting point. Those who still laud the media as ‘the fourth estate’ have 
been particularly pessimistic about the possibility that commercialised TV of any 
kind can be anything other than self-serving (Beecher, 2000; Herman, 1998; see 
also McKee, 2002; McKee, 2005). Objective, ‘[r]ational analysis and thorough, 
dispassionate investigation’ (MacDonald, 2000: 251) – what is still termed ‘hard’, 
or ‘high-modern’, news – have been seen as the normative standards for ‘quality’ 
journalism the public should engage with. However, over the last two decades – 
or thereabouts – the public has progressively turned away from these forms of 
‘quality’ news, and we have seen a speedy rise of more popular forms of news 
and current affairs programming, often labelled as ‘tabloid’. Even though the term 
bears no relation to news media in the world of broadcasting – being derived 
solely from the realm of newspapers – the word’s meaning has shifted to denote 
any popular form of journalism. 
 
There is some conjecture about where name ‘tabloid’ began. One dominant 
theory is that it is a rip-off from a medicine name of the late nineteenth century (a 
neologism combining tablet and alkaloid), because tabloid newspapers (A3 size), 
at half the size of broadsheets (A2), were thought of as ‘a small, concentrated, 
effective pill, containing all news needs within one handy package’ (Ornebring 
and Jonsson, 2004: 287). The major selling point of tabloid-sized newspapers 
was exactly that handiness, which in particular made them far easier to read on 
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mass public transport systems than the more bulky A2 sized broadsheets3. This 
change caused a key shift in readership, which – alongside dramatically 
improving literacy levels – meant that the average working class person had 
suddenly become a major part of the reading public (Ornebring and Jonsson, 
2004). Since then, the format and content of tabloids have been continually 
linked, which accounts for why the term is almost never described as ‘”good” in 
any traditional sense of the word’ (Dahlgren, 1992: 18) and perhaps why it is also 
synonymous with journalism’s ‘darker’ side (e.g. the evil paparazzi). Being 
designed, quite literally, for ‘the masses’ gave rise to the following series of 
binary distinctions which still persist to this day4: 
 
Popular Quality 
Tabloid Broadsheet 
Soft Hard 
Trash Value 
Personal Political 
Private Public 
Popular Culture High Culture 
Emotional Rational 
Lay Knowledge Expert Knowledge 
Celebrity Intellectual 
Consumer Citizen 
Trivial Serious 
Feminine Masculine 
Profit Service 
Micro-politics Macro-politics 
Wants Needs 
 
 
Table 1: Popular Vs ‘Quality’ News Binaries 
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Through these binary discourses, anything on the left is derided (even 
though such aspects are favoured by the public), and anything on the right is 
seen as the desirable modality; personalisation is equated with trashiness, and 
popularity instantly linked to triviality. In the end, anything which overtly attempts 
to maximise its audience is apparently unworthy of attention, illustrating the 
persistence of the still lingering distinction that: ‘Ultimately, information is judged 
to provide “good” television and entertainment “bad”’ (Fiske, 1989: 185). 
Nevertheless, due to changing allegiances, and new priorities from serving the 
public to serving ‘the company’, many have seen a clear decline in the standards 
of journalism. Although the generic suggestion that things used to be better is all 
too often rolled out to critique contemporary cultural forms, some theorists have 
illustrated that the past two decades in particular have seen the phenomenon of 
‘tabloidisation’ take a stranglehold hold far more so than ever before. Whereas 
news was literally the thing that television networks once gave away out of a 
sense of service5, it has become, like almost everything else in the media, 
another necessary part of a corporation’s desire (and need) to pursue revenue. 
So pervasive has this phenomenon been that even the meaning of the term 
‘tabloidisation’ has moved beyond a mere description of the trend for commercial 
pressures to “win out” more often in the newsroom, to today become ‘a 
portmanteau description for what is regarded as the trivialisation of media 
content in general’ (Turner, 2004: 76). 
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One of the most notable analyses of the apparently declining standards of 
journalism is Bob Franklin’s Newszak. In his account of the shift in the editorial 
practices of the contemporary news media, Franklin (1997) sees many of the 
tabloid characteristics listed above as a major retreat from the kind of journalism 
which serves society and serves dutiful citizens; that the news media are simply 
too often ‘concerned to report stories which interest the public than stories which 
are in the public interest’ (p. 4). The author looks at the way in which news is 
presented as just another form of entertainment, examining modern newsroom 
cultures and ownership patterns along the way for good measure (given they are 
so closely linked). Franklin (1997) points out that while tabloid news forms were 
apparently once simply a sideshow to mostly quality journalism, tabloid news 
values are now almost completely rife in the media. Even though there have 
been numerous scholars quick to point out on the issue that many newspapers of 
past centuries treasured a sea monster tale or openly gossiped over the sexual 
dealings of townspeople (Lumby, 1999b; Glynn, 2000; Winch, 1997: 5-7), 
Franklin is one of the many who argue that the proliferation of popular news is a 
particularly recent phenomenon (see also Hallin, 1994: 170-180). It may appear 
to be a case of romanticising the past, but Franklin (1997: 4) notes that: ‘Since 
the late 1980s the pressures on news media to win viewers and readers in an 
increasingly competitive market have generated revised editorial ambitions. 
News media have increasingly become part of the entertainment industry.’  
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As the concept of being able to simultaneously produce both news and 
money began to take hold in the domain of television6, the pursuit of profit saw 
media outlets turn away from their original mission of quality journalism (to be a 
‘loss leader’ – which was a badge of honour in many ways), and focus instead on 
circulation or ratings figures to therefore increase profits for investors who are 
concerned only with financial imperatives (Meyer, 2003: 12; Hallin, 1994: 176). 
Rather than competing with rival networks to come up with the best service and 
therefore satisfy consumers, ‘It’s all about cutting the cost of production’ (Miller, 
2007: 16). Fox News is perhaps the ultimate contemporary example of these 
forces at play: a network that speaks of its ‘fair and balanced’ approach, yet – as 
documented by Robert Greenwald’s 2004 film Outfoxed – one which has taken 
journalistic ethics to the bottom of the priority list, instead choosing to deliberately 
promote a right-wing agenda in order to maximise its audience at a time when 
conservative public opinion seems to be running at an intense high. Most news 
professionals, in fact, may still claim to be serving the public with ‘no fear, no 
favour’7, but for most cases in the 21st century – except perhaps those in a 
publicly-funded capacity – the most basic instinct must be to win the ratings 
battle (Turner, 2005: 49-62; Pieper, 2000: 72-74). The key result of this is that 
rather than holding governments accountable for their actions, or increasing the 
public’s understanding of matters in ‘ways that enable citizens to understand and 
to act’ (Schudson, 1998: 30-31), various news programs have often resorted to 
populist strategies in order to maximize ratings.  
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Australians are privy to the effects of this situation in brilliant detail at 
6:30pm every weeknight when A Current Affair (on the Nine Network) and Today 
Tonight (on Seven) square-off for the biggest slice of the audience pie with their 
staple of neighbourhood disputes, hyper-bureaucratic local councils, celebrity 
gossip and the ongoing ‘generic versus name brands’ investigation. These often 
emotionally-charged (yet arguably very shallow) topics – loaded with the genre’s 
now characteristic sense of self-importance – lead regularly to the conclusion 
that infotainment trivialises news and current affairs, because these sorts of 
stories do little to provide education about and engagement with issues of high 
significance such as politics (Hallin, 1994: 177; Cunningham and Miller, 1994: 44; 
Machin and Papatheoderou, 2002; McKee, 2002). For instance, the Australian 
public have been treated to stories about how one can increase their chances of 
winning the lottery, towns ‘held ransom’ by gangs of juvenile offenders (and why 
police are – of course – powerless to stop them), making the most of coupon 
savings, political correctness gone mad, why heartless politicians have 
abandoned common sense8, and the apparently ongoing investigation, ‘Butter Vs 
Margarine’. On 20 July 2004, A Current Affair’s host, Ray Martin, could even be 
heard uttering the phrase, ‘coming up next, how your pet can make you rich.’  
 
These populist news programs cherish ‘stories such as “Helping Pensioner 
Pat”’ because ‘the opportunity to “act” or empathize within the community, and 
“respond” to a real tragedy provides a cathartic outlet for those who feel helpless, 
or even disinclined to do anything on a larger social or world scale’ (Roberts, 
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2004: 21). Moving into this extremely personal and overly sensational sphere of 
information can easily arouse an emotional response (perhaps attracting more 
viewers), yet it does not demand from its audience a response that goes beyond 
anger or empathy because ordinary people are given few indications about how 
they might play a participative role in the issue. Audiences for these programs 
are therefore too often shown no way of action aside from sitting idly and playing 
the role of fuming observer. The real problem here then is that the programs 
which thrive on these stories will regularly tend to mask the deeper and more 
complex causes of problems – the things that journalists should be exposing – 
instead looking for a simplified narrative in which (all too often) an average Joe is 
the innocent victim of a powerful person’s lack of compassion.  
 
To propagate simple marketing terms, the ‘value-added’ of tabloid journalism 
may largely come from a changing set of news-values, often weighted in favour 
of the dramatic, ‘lurid’, entertaining and spectacular (Meyer, 2003: 12). This 
‘cacophony of the glamorous, the trivial and the melodramatic’ (Machin and 
Papatheoderou, 2002: 41) is exactly what critics such as Herman (1998) believe 
is causing a destruction of the classical public sphere. Like every other part of the 
media, news has been seen to have since been – as McKee (2005) outlines in 
his book The Public Sphere – trivialised, commercialised, and turned into a 
spectacle to the detriment of genuine citizenry engagement and empowerment. 
Whether it is explicit or not, at the core of all such arguments is the simple notion 
that news and current affairs programs are supposed to be a cultural industry, yet 
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this imperative has been forgotten or ignored in the drive to be another profit-
maker for an affiliated network (Turner, 2001: 352). So, by having to now appeal 
to as many people as possible (rather than be concerned with the quality of the 
service), news programs are often just giving audiences what they want rather 
than what they need (Winch, 1997: 21).  
 
The provision of wants over needs is seen to have caused an audience 
‘dumbing down’ and is considered such a tragedy because of the fact that, as 
mentioned above, journalism is still regarded as a vital cog in the democratic 
process. In Australia this is an even more intense problem because, as 
discussed earlier in this paper, ‘soft’ infotainment has mostly displaced ‘hard’ 
news on television, rather than act in a complimentary fashion. Graeme Turner 
has coined perhaps the most apt term for this moment – ‘junk’ news: ‘like “junk 
food”, it looks like news, is sold like news, but it is an unhealthy component of the 
news diet’ (Turner, 1996a: 41). Perhaps much of the problem may lie in viewers’ 
blind acceptance of the ‘noble-newscasting’ rhetoric these shows employ, without 
looking critically behind the façade to see if there is really something meaningful 
working there. Perhaps, as Morley (1999: 142) notes, ‘… the distant world of “the 
news” is so disconnected from popular experience that it [may be] beyond critical 
judgement for many viewers.’ 
 
One of the main problems with the idealised system of ‘hard’ news, 
however, is that in the twenty-first century it has become more and more difficult 
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to sell and find an audience for it (Turner, 2005: 5-10). In many cases, a change 
towards ‘tabloidised’ news programming has not been a result of laziness in 
television newsrooms (effectively a chicken—egg argument), but has been 
genuinely forced by audience news consumption patterns. The well-charted 
audience shift away from ‘hard’ news has therefore put the profession in a very 
difficult position, being torn between two agendas: on one hand the fruits of its 
labour will be mostly useless unless they are seen by a significant number of 
citizens, and on the other, pandering to an audience goes against many core 
journalistic principals. However, if when these standards are applied to a product 
that subsequently fails to reach an audience or readership, then it serves little 
purpose and is unlikely to make a profit at a time of heightened commercial 
pressures, where many media outlets are effectively at the mercy of short-term 
investors (Meyer, 2003: 12). We need to remember that TV news needs to reach 
an audience in order to exist, rather than simply being the charitable loss-making 
arm of a larger media outlet. This need for survival has been just one 
consideration that has caused many (particularly cultural studies) academics to 
re-think the value of ‘tabloid’ or popular news forms.  
 
 
THE POPULAR NEWS 
 
One the one hand, attempts to maximise audiences for news programs can 
be a direct subversion of the role journalism is supposed to serve, and yet, on the 
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other hand its often massive appeal9 has lead to suggestions that popular news 
forms represent a process of democratisation; putting news back into the hands 
of ‘the people’, creating ‘a new, more open and more egalitarian public sphere’ 
(Lumby, 1999a: 38). Celebrating the ‘ordinary as much as the distinguished’ 
(Machin and Papatheoderou, 2002: 46), and setting up ‘personal experience as a 
legitimate form of knowledge’ (p. 47), these often maligned (but nevertheless 
popular) versions of news have been used by some as proof that ‘emotionalism, 
sensation and simplification are not necessarily opposed to serving the public 
good’ (Ornebring and Jonsson, 2004: 284). Often articulated alongside 
discourses of femininity (Van Zoonen, 1991; Lumby, 1999a; Hartley, 1996), they 
have been seen by many as a useful response to the demands of the audience – 
who apparently no longer want ‘hard’ news – and the requirement to make 
money and therefore stay in business. As Chris Masters – one of the most 
renowned investigative journalists in Australian television – has noted: ‘[p]eople 
don’t want a lecture when they get home from a day's work’ (2002: 4). 
 
One of the key ways in which tabloid news has been re-thought has been in 
relation to its ability to invert hegemonic paradigms, make obscure topics 
relevant by linking them to personal perspectives, and its popularisation – rather 
than simple destruction – of the television genre at the heart of the public sphere 
(Lumby and O'Neil, 1994; Hartley, 1996; Machin and Papatheoderou, 2002; 
McKee, 2002; Shattuc, 1997; Bek, 2004). This concern is commonly related to 
issues of personalisation in tabloid journalism, which involves linking the private 
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and public spheres or placing private issues in the public arena (Machin and 
Papatheoderou, 2002: 36; Wark, 1997; Manga, 2003: 144; Lumby and O'Neil, 
1994; Turner, 1999; Costera Meijer, 2001). Despite the fact that personal issues 
are typically seen as inherently trivial (both being linked to discourses of popular 
news), Machin and Papatheoderou (2002: 47-48), for example, point out that 
‘abstract claims can become relevant and ring true only if authenticated through 
an individual’s own life experiences’. 
 
Tabloid news’ links between the private and public spheres – traditionally 
feminine and masculine domains respectively (Hartley, 1992; Van Zoonen, 1991) 
– may instead be seen as a popularising and democratising force, promoting 
social and cultural inclusion, whereas the idealised public sphere of the 
Enlightenment was criticised for its exclusion of both women and the less-
educated (McGuigan, 1998). It has even been suggested that a handful of people 
watching an in-depth news program is worse than a large number consuming a 
popular/tabloid text because it will only serve to widen a pre-existing knowledge 
divide between citizens (Hallin, 1994: 180; Fiske, 1989: 192). On the other hand, 
if we are to believe Hartley (1992), distinctions between the public and private 
spheres have become ambiguous to the point of irrelevancy anyway, and the 
idea of gendering them either way may no longer be a valid exercise. Perhaps it 
is just that ‘individual people are easier to identify – and to identify with – than 
structures, forces or institutions’ (Hartley, 1982: 78), and thus a focus on private 
issues is essentially a sense-making practice of contextualisation. Popular news’ 
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use of these disparaged elements may simply be a way of engaging viewers’ 
interests more fully and relevantly (Fiske, 1989; Hartley, 1996). In fact, concepts 
such as femininity, lay knowledge, the ‘personal’ and the ‘popular’ may be merely 
applied from elitist standpoints to ‘trash’ the worth of tabloid news – in much the 
same way that almost all popular culture is looked down upon. It is likely too that 
these stories are simply driven by audience viewing patterns, because a free 
market will tend to err towards providing for the needs of consumers (Curran, 
1996: 91). 
 
Catharine Lumby has thoroughly explored the outdated division between the 
mythologised ‘political man’ and ‘private woman’ – especially in her book Gotcha 
(1999a) – and how this is tied to notions of tabloidisation (Lumby, 1999b, for 
instance). She, like Langer (1998) and McKee (2005: 47), has suggested that 
many of the binaries relating to tabloidisation (listed in figure 1, on page 6) – like 
most distinctions between ‘high’ and popular cultural forms – are ‘terms which 
are based more in prejudice than in contemporary reality’ (Lumby, 1999a: 16-17). 
She notes in particular that tabloid media have allowed feminised discourses a 
place in public consciousness, rather than regularly ignoring them or passing 
them off as unworthy (as is the case with most ‘hard’/high-modern news). This 
would undoubtedly be seen as a democratic strength for the postmodern public 
sphere and avoids the notion that exposition of private issues is necessarily 
dealing with the trivial (Turner, 2000; Fiske, 1987). Lumby (1999a: 17) makes the 
significant assertion that ‘apparently banal stories about celebrities and ordinary 
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people who have extraordinary experiences often intersect with deeper social 
and political issues and frame these issues in a way many people find easier to 
digest.’  
 
To further deconstruct the public/private divide, it could be argued that at a 
basic level the public is a collection of individuals, and using personal issues and 
information is not necessarily an abandonment of democratic ideals. Electoral 
participation in the form of voting is perhaps the ultimate democratic act (the 
‘political’), but one that is only possible through the actions of individuals (the 
‘personal’). But, because journalists have ‘tended to work with rather narrow 
conceptions of what is political’ (Connell, 1991: 242), any shift of focus away from 
institutional politics has been seen as a retreat from the weighty. Yet politics, as 
Van Zoonen (2005: 5) points out, is also ‘a “field” that exists independently from 
its practitioners, and that accommodates the continuous struggle about power 
relations in society.’ The phrase made famous by feminism, ‘the personal is 
political’ (see Heywood, 1998: 243, for instance), certainly rings true here and 
neatly sums up the changing thoughts about popular news’ more intimate 
iterations, and its links to femininity. 
 
So, while Lumby and many others have rightly argued that tabloidism is not 
necessarily bad in itself, this does not mean that commercial pressures in an 
ever-fragmenting television market have not caused quantifiable decreases in – 
for instance – editorial independence, funding for investigative reportage, and 
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attention towards stories which may sit on the wrong side of the maximum 
audience at minimal cost model. And, without wishing to further polarise current 
debates, I would argue that academic considerations of journalism must still find 
some room for concern over the potential negative effects of populist news, and 
(although not an aspect pursued here) the regular lack of ethics involved in its 
production. All news programming, no matter what arguments are invoked, 
should never be allowed escape its requirement to still ‘disseminate knowledge 
that the people may not wish to know and may find little pleasure or relevance in 
knowing’ (Fiske, 1989: 149). Just because something is popular does not excuse 
it from the role which it was created to serve in the first place especially when 
that role is still so vital to the health of the public sphere. Although movements in 
the last twenty years to acknowledge the value of popular forms of news have 
been a significant step towards genuinely reconsidering the most effective way of 
undertaking the practice of journalism, the argument that the news agenda ‘has 
been trivialized in [many ways], with more attention to stories like celebrity trials 
and beached whales’ (Hallin, 1994: 177) is a compelling one, and cannot be 
easily explained away. Hirst et al. (1995: 97) pose this very simple, yet very 
important question: ‘When is entertainment too much?’ 
 
There needs to be a point at which we recognise a middle-ground between 
the overly pessimistic and over celebratory accounts of modern news, and also 
begin to flesh-out the important differences between genuinely democratic and 
merely demotic news forms. In fact, this is perhaps the key criticism that can be 
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levelled at many of those who have celebrated ‘tabloidisation’ and its prospective 
benefits for the average consumer: popularity does not necessarily equal 
democratisation. To return to a previous example, Fox News is the most popular 
cable news network in the United States, but that does not mean that it should be 
held up as an ideal model for news broadcasting the world over because of what 
it does to empower the average American. And, at the other extreme, neither 
should C-SPAN, given its not unexpected failures in actually reaching and 
appealing to citizens. In all of these arguments though, we also need to 
recognise the point where other media genres – devoid of what we might 
recognise as ‘traditional journalism’ – also offer up something important. 
 
 
A ‘NEW’ PARADIGM? 
 
What I have attempted to argue so far in this paper is that there has been a 
debate going on between those who have conflicting views on the same 
phenomenon. Now though, I would like to find a meeting point between both 
approaches, and point out that these debates have in fact been too narrow in 
their view about what counts as ‘the news’. Knowledge, argues Cottle (2001: 76), 
‘is no longer a gift carefully wrapped by experts’, and yet rather than having a 
more dynamic, inclusive and culturally progressive understanding of the role of 
the journalist, the prevailing consensus within many academic debates is that the 
profession is an exclusive one, even in spite of the fact that it is nearly impossible 
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to define it and account for all its forms (Bishop, 2004; Deuze, 2005; Hartley, 
1995). Therefore, I would argue that we should seek out a new critical paradigm 
(or re-discover an old one) which can take into account the complexities of the 
news media in the twenty-first century, and the fact that news is now regularly 
produced by those who would not be traditionally considered journalists. Liz 
Jacka argues the point almost perfectly: 
 
If we impose an ideal type of communication… one inevitably sees any 
departure from this also as a crisis. If, however, we see democracy as 
pluralized, as marked by new kinds of communities of identity, as a system 
in which the traditional public-private divide does not apply… then we will be 
able to countenance a plurality of communication media and modes in 
which such a diverse set of exchanges will occur. We will be open to the 
notion that ethical discourse can be present in many different kinds and 
genres of media texts and in many different forms of media organization 
[sic]. We will no longer privilege “high modern journalism,” but nor will we 
mindlessly worship populist media. We will need a much more nuanced 
account of the connection between (various forms of) citizenship and the 
media… (Jacka, 2003: 183) 
 
If we look, for example, at the introduction to the book Tabloid Tales, we see 
Colin Sparks (2000) spending a great deal of time outlining a hierarchy of popular 
news forms from ‘The “serious” press’ all the way down to ‘The “supermarket 
 21
tabloid” press’. Though such a comprehensive attempt to distinguish between 
different ‘degrees’ of popularity is definitely useful, it may simply muddy the 
waters, and makes little attempt to acknowledge the fact that news can be 
produced by a range of outlets not normally seen as neither ‘valid’ – or indeed 
news in the traditional sense of the word. This example is a classic case of 
debating the issues at the expense of noticing new cases emerging in popular 
culture. A brilliant example that simply does not fit into traditional considerations 
of popular news would be the work of Michael Moore, who, through the media of 
film, television and best-selling books, has managed to make critiques of serious 
political issues entertaining, perhaps because he is not a journalist. Turner (2005: 
89-90) notes that ‘Moore… uses [tabloid tactics and spectacular stunts] primarily 
against the strong and the powerful; almost uniformly his targets are big 
companies or institutions and elite individuals.’ If news is thought of in an overly 
narrow fashion, cases such as this might not be deemed significant (where I 
would argue that it definitely is), or, more problematically, not be considered at 
all. Michael Moore aside, Turner (2005), and Jones (2005) among other scholars, 
have discussed numerous examples of this sort of news production from Graeme 
Kennedy’s News Show10 through to more prominent programs such as Politically 
Incorrect, pointing out along the way that the tactics these programs employ are 
not journalism per se, but may be a positive response to the demands of 
audiences and may still hold some sort of cultural (if not political) significance in 
the public sphere.  
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New forms of informational programming like Michael Moore’s The Awful 
Truth, which are sometimes called ‘new’ news11 (see Harrington, 2005), do two 
things that were once considered mutually exclusive – entertain and genuinely 
inform citizens about politics (giving people what they want and need?) – so they 
have fallen outside (or between) the traditional distinctions of ‘tabloid’ and 
‘broadsheet’ or indeed ‘high’ and ‘low’. They are therefore not recognised by the 
too regularly replicated binary divisions listed in figure 1 (page 6), which is, to me, 
some proof that finding another approach to critiques of journalism is overdue. 
This is especially so when many researchers have pointed out that ‘new’ news 
may offer the potential of a significant re-invigoration of journalistic enquiry. The 
many critics – notably Lumby (1999a), Hartley (1996), Winch (1997) and Langer 
(1998) – who have re-thought the high/low, popular/quality binaries in regards to 
news also rightly point out the similarities between tabloid and broadsheet forms 
of news, meaning that it may be time to move critiques of journalism into the 
twenty-first century – a time when, for many people, Stephen Colbert (from 
Comedy Central’s The Colbert Report) is a more respected commentator on the 
news and politics than many of the self-styled ‘experts’ who litter the op-ed 
columns of newspapers around the world. As Jeff Jones (2005: 4) puts it very 
concisely: ‘The nightly sense-making of events is processed in new ways by new 
voices, and rarely operates by the previous assumptions that guided televised 
political discourse.’ 
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Given the massive upheavals in the news media in the past two decades (a 
few of which have been discussed here), it could be suggested that many of the 
old debates between cultural studies scholars and journalism academics no 
longer apply. Or, perhaps just inverting old hierarchies is not enough to account 
for the ‘communication chaos’ (McNair, 2003: 552) that has become a notable 
characteristic of journalism in the last decade. It is important at this point to 
remember that ‘journalistic’ undertakings are not the exclusive domain of ‘news’ 
programs; that news and the news (the genre) are two very distinct entities. 
Indeed, doing so may actually increase the ability of citizens to examine the news 
product presented to them in a critical fashion by illustrating that there is often a 
large gap between what TV news programs claim to do and what they actually 
offer (or ‘do for’) their audiences. Indeed, there needs to come a point where we 
no longer legitimate populist news as worthwhile simply because it is labelled as 
journalism (see the arguments made by Turner, 1996b). 
 
As a way then of overcoming some of the inadequacies found in the 
previous critiques of popular news that have been discussed in this paper I would 
like to return to John Fiske’s argument for a slightly different approach to popular 
forms of news. While it is not new as such, in the present media environment it 
does seem to make a lot of sense: ‘We should not criticize [popular news] for 
“pandering” to entertainment’ Fiske notes (1989: 193, original emphasis), ‘but 
rather should evaluate how entertaining it is, and what information it makes 
entertaining.’ Ultimately, I think, this is the key notion: what information? More 
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generally, considerations of popular journalism may need to start thinking less 
about who (or what) is producing the information, and think more in terms of the 
ends that may/may not be achieved as a result. We should not simply pass 
something off merely because it is popular then – or indeed emotional, feminine, 
personal, sensational, and so on (including many of those features listed on the 
left-hand side of table 1) – or because it does not conform to the key textual 
features of journalism, but gather a critique around what information is being 
used in this way. ‘For what purpose?’ journalism and cultural studies academics 
should ask, and, perhaps, ‘in who’s interests?’ rather than the less important – 
and, in fact, far more easily answered – textual question of ‘how…?’. This way 
we can acknowledge what popular news offers, but not be blind to the pitfalls that 
can often come with it.  
 
Such a simple change in our approach means that we can, for instance, 
make a far more significant and useful distinction between Entertainment Tonight 
and The Daily Show: both are popular, and neither are traditional forms of news, 
but only one of them actually uses that popularity to deal with the issues which 
have a significant impact within the public sphere (see, for instance, Baym, 
2005), while the other spends its time gossiping with great seriousness over the 
personal lives of celebrities.  It means we should be open to the potential of an A 
Current Affair story about the serious issue of youth unemployment, but be highly 
sceptical about that same program framing that issue as ‘The Paxtons: Version 
2.0’12. Looking at things in terms of ends, rather than means, we might be 
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impressed by the significance of what David Letterman did to Bill O’Reilly on The 
Late Show in early 200613, but be less amazed by what O’Reilly does most days 
over on Fox – here in Australia we might approach ‘shock-jock’ talkback radio 
hosts John Laws and Alan Jones in a similar way. Today Tonight might conform 
(almost perfectly) to the tabloid current affairs archetype, but that does not mean 
that it does not, or cannot, produce journalism that is rigorous, interesting and 
politically significant. Weblogs as a potential form of journalism could likewise be 
seen in this same light: some are noteworthy contributions to the public sphere, 
many others recount completely irrelevant personal anecdotes, while several 
expose some of the most extreme forms of prejudice. Thus, broad-scale, 
simplistic judgement in this case is insufficient. 
 
Looking at popular news in the way Fiske (1989: 193) does still 
acknowledges the distinction between being democratic (and acting for the 
public), and simply being demotic in reaching the public. What it may also do 
though is usefully undermine the hollow arguments made by many newspeople 
when they invoke the phrase ‘in the public interest’ to defend unethical practices. 
If all journalists worked to provide what the public was already interested in, then 
there would be no place for investigative journalism (of which there is currently 
little in Australia) which has such a long tradition within the profession. In reality, 
it should be the role of the media to both follow and guide public opinion in a 
cyclical manner. Commercial pressures in many areas of news broadcasting are 
real, as are the possibilities that other media forms and genres offer, but that 
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does not mean that the end result is either necessarily ‘democratised’ or just 
mindless entertainment. 
 
Rather than simply argue over what counts as a worthy way of informing the 
public, we might be better off trying to determine what is popular and what is 
populist. Looking at journalism in terms of its purpose might mean we instead 
debate the differences between being genuinely democratic and simply being 
demotic: which, intellectually, is actually a far more challenging and significant 
undertaking – and provides us with a more nuanced view of the state of modern 
journalism. Whether or not this approach is the best mode of critique is a matter 
for open debate of course, but it may still be a starting point for some useful 
change. Popularising news is a noble cause in many respects, and we should 
celebrate the marvellous opportunities provided by it, but we still need to be 
critical of what news becomes popular, and be wary when such opportunities are 
used up on thinly disguised advertorials about yet another type of diet pill. 
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NOTES 
                                                 
1 From here on, the term ‘News’ will continue to denote both news and current affairs genres. 
2 Having said this, the ABC has lurched from one funding crisis to another over the last ten years, 
and the extent of its news services is severely constrained by its budget limitations. However, the 
fact that a public service broadcaster such as the ABC is seemingly ‘immune’ from the supposed 
‘tabloid infection’ is further evidence that this ‘virus might be [the] product of commercial 
ownership, not the creation of the tabloids’ (Pieper, 2000: 73). 
3 Even today the same still applies – when Brisbane broadsheet The Courier Mail (that city’s only 
daily newspaper) announced that it would be changing to a tabloid size in late 2005, editors cited 
the demands of commuters as the biggest reason behind the change (Lehmann, 2005), and the 
paper was marketed heavily in these terms (“Go Anywhere”). 
4 Partially derived from Hartley (1996: 27) and Winch (1997: 21). See also Costera Meijer (2001: 
190). 
5 Its importance is still invoked by networks when they wish to point out their relevance to society 
(see Fiske, 1987: 281). 
6 60 Minutes is noted as the program that first destroyed the then-conventional wisdom that news 
and current affairs could not also be profitable (see Miller, 2007: 19). 
7 This was A Current Affair’s slogan for some time in 2005. 
8 Hypocritically, when a lack of so-called ‘bureaucratic red-tape’ ends up in tragedy or failure, this 
is also covered in negative tones (e.g. “how the government failed this family”). 
9 Today Tonight, a program notorious for its employment of tabloid tactics treatment of news, is 
presently the highest rating current affairs program in Australia. 
10 A short-lived entertaining Australian program which (perhaps slightly awkwardly) blended news 
and entertainment to previously unseen levels (Turner, 1996b). 
11 Although this term does itself have various problems, it is nevertheless useful in attempting to 
understand some of the changes being discussed here. 
12 The Paxtons are a family whose teenage children were unfairly demonised briefly in the mid-
1990s by A Current Affair (and, subsequently, the Australian public) because they turned down 
(apparently staged) offers to work at an island resort, were subsequently framed as lazy, and 
therefore seemed to be stereotypical young people cheating the welfare system (see Turner, 
1999: 70-71). 
13 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bill_O%27Reilly_controversies#David_Letterman for a brief 
summary of the encounter. 
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